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Recent Legislation
OHIO'S MANDATORY BEPORTING STATUTE FOR
CASES OF CHILD ABUSE
OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.421 (Supp. 1966).
In 1963 Ohio became one of the first states to enact so-called
"child-battering" legislation.1  The main thrust of such legislation
is to direct physicians and other medical personnel to report any
case of child injury which they believe to have been caused by physi-
cal abuse. Although the Ohio statute, and those of many other
pioneering states, was desirably responsive to a problem which had
been receiving increasing attention, it was somewhat deficient due to
its hasty conception and the fact that some important ramifications
of the problem were not sufficiently dear at the time of enactment
to be reflected in the legislation. With these shortcomings in mind,
the Ohio statute was significantly amended in the 1965 session of
the General Assembly.I
Section 2151.421 of the Ohio Revised Code requires any physi-
cian examining or treating a child less than eighteen years of age or
any registered nurse, visiting nurse, school teacher, or social worker
who has reason to believe that such child has suffered an injury
or condition indicating abuse or neglect to report that information
to a municipal or county peace officer. While the initial communi-
cation may be made in person or by telephone there must later be
a written report containing the minimal pertinent information, such
as the names of the parties, addresses, the nature and extent of the
injuries, and any other information which might be helpful in estab-
lishing the cause of the injury or condition! The statute further
provides that when a child is treated by a physician who is a staff
member of a hospital or similar institution, the physician is to no-
tify the person in charge of the institution, who will in turn make
the report.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the amended Ohio
reporting law and to compare its provisions not only with the 1963
statute but also with similar statutes of other states. In the course
of this analysis it is hoped that the statute can be evaluated in rela-
tion to the problem it attempts to remedy.
1 Ohio Laws 1963, § 2151.421, at 625-26.
2 OHIo REv. CODE § 2151.421 (Supp. 1966).
3 OHio REv. CODE § 2151.421(C) (Supp. 1966).
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The abuse of children by parents and guardians is a problem
of ancient origin.4 As in other areas of family relations, interfer-
ence by the state has always been restrained. However, the problem
has recently received increased attention, and a survey of the litera-
ture on the subject discloses that the initial impetus was provided
by the medical and social service professions.5
In 1962 several physicians defined the "Battered Child Syn-
drome" as a young child's clinical condition resulting from serious
physical beatings and abuse.' Additional case and survey studies
pointed to the seriousness and extent of the problem.7 From these
studies facts were brought to light which awakened the public and
legislative bodies to the realization that a problem existed whose
solution challenges social, medical, and legal resources alike.
For example, one survey pointed out that a majority of the vic-
tims of physical abuse by parents were infants under four years of
age. It is also noteworthy that these incidents were not peculiar
to any particular socioeconomic group but occurred in "country dub
districts" as well as slum areas.' Finally, the most significant fact
brought out - significant because it aptly indicates the wide scope
of the problem - was that the majority of child abuse cases, while
directly the result of parental cruelty, were symptomatic of deeper
psychiatric and emotional problems. It was said:
Rarely is child abuse the product of wanton, willful or deliberate
acts of cruelty. It is seen to result from parental inadequacy, from
immaturity and from lack of capacity for coping with the pres-
4 For a comparison of the Roman and common law philosophies on the legitimate
extent of parental authority over children, see, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*452.
5 See generally DE FRANCIS, CHILDREN'S DvsIoN, AM. HUMANE Ass'N, Cu
ABUSE - PREVIEW OF A NATIONWME SURVEY (1963); Adelson, Homicide by Starva-
tion, 186 J.A.M.A. 458 (1963); Kempe, Silverman, Steel, Droegenmueller & Silver,
The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962); Reinhart & Elmer, The Abused
Child, 188 J.A.M.A. 360 (1964).
6 Kempe, Silverman, Steel, Droegenmueller & Silver, supra note 5, at 17 suggested
that the syndrome should be considered by physicians whenever a child injury case is
brought to their attention which exhibited any indications of child-beating such as
bone fractures, a failure to thrive, soft tissue swellings, or skin bruisings. The syndrome
was also prevalent where the child was found to have suffered a sudden unexplained
death, or where there was little relation between the observed injuries and the parents'
explanation. Ibid.
7 See, e.g., DE FRANCIS, op. cit. supra note 5; Adelson, supra note 5, at 458.
8 DE FRANCIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 4. The abuse ranged from severe beatings
and burnings to strangulations and suffocations. The resultant injuries from such cruel-
ties varied from severe bruises and contusions to ruptured lungs and skull fractures.
Id. at 5-6.
9Id. at 8.
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sures and tensions which beset the modem family. With rare ex-
ceptions these are parents with problems - problems which run
the full range of human experience.'
The wide publicity received by such medical and sociological
studies prompted state legislatures to re-evaluate laws on the subject.
The result was a flurry of legislative enactments which became pop-
ularly known as "battered child laws." Presently, Ohio is one of
forty-seven states which have such a law.11 Mandatory reporting
statutes are needed not only to define child abuse as a crime but
also to develop the legal machinery to detect it,'2 since the violent
maltreatment of children could be punishable on some premise of
battery, aggravated assault, cruelty to children, or murder or man-
slaughter if death resulted." Section 2151.421 of the Revised Code
is directed to this end.
The broader scope of the amended Ohio law is a distinguishing
characteristic from the original statute 4 and those of other states.15
While most statutes limit the reporting requirement to physicians,
surgeons, or other medical personnel, Ohio imposes the duty not
only on these individuals but also upon school teachers and social
workers acting in their official capacities. The broad coverage of
the Ohio statute seems to be supported by the fact that some studies
have indicated that a great number of child abuse cases are referred
to the authorities by persons other than physicians.' More impor-
tant, by imposing the duty to report upon more than one group,
the legislature recognized the curtailment of child abuse as a truly
10 Id. at 2-3. See Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocent, 264 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1345
(1961).
"1 The exceptions are Alabama, Hawaii, Mississippi, and the District of Columbia.
12Interview With Dr. Lester Adelson, Assistant County Coroner for Cuyahoga
County, in Cleveland, Ohio, Feb. 27, 1967.
'
3 See, e.g., Onto REv CODE 5 2903.08: "No person having the control of or being
the parent or guardian of a child under the age of sixteen years shall willfully abandon
such child, or torture, torment, or cruelly or unlawfully punish him, or willfully or neg-
ligently fail to furnish him necessary and proper food, clothing, or shelter." See also
OHIo REV. CODE §§ 2151.41 (prohibition against abuse, or abetting delinquency of a
child) and 2151.42 (prohibition against neglecting or mistreating a child).
14 Compare Onto REV. CODE § 2151.421, which applies to "any physician, includ-
ing a hospital intern or resident physician... or any registered nurse, visting nurse,
school teacher, or social worker, acting in his official capacity, having reason to believe
that a child ... has suffered any wound," with the 1963 statute, Ohio Laws 1963, §
2151.421, at 625, which was directed merely to any physician, including a hospital in-
tern or resident physician.
15 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1420 (Supp. 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §
2042 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966). Bat see WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14.28.1 (1957).
16 See, e.g., McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part
One, 50 MINN. L REv. 1, 13 (1966), where it is reported that in one such study, only
nine percent of the referrals were by doctors or other medical personnel.
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social problem. Statutes restricting their application merely to the
medical profession have been criticized as shortsighted in regard to
the primary goal that reporting legislation should have, namely,
the efficient reduction of child abuse."
It would seem that the solution requires the cooperation of not
just one group but of all professional individuals who would be
most likely to detect such cases. Under these circumstances the
broad application of the Ohio statute seems both desirable and prac-
tical. 8 Nevertheless, the heaviest burden rests with private physi-
cians and hospital personnel, who not only are most likely to come
in contact with cases of child abuse but also may be the most quali-
fied to detect them.
Another interesting feature of the amended statute is the manda-
tory nature of the reporting clause."9 In this respect, Ohio is in ac-
cord with a majority of states which have enacted such statutes.
However, statutes containing permissive rather than mandatory lan-
guage are in effect in Alaska," Missouri,2 ' New Mexico, '2 North
Carolina, 3 Texas,24 and Washington.25 Although this difference
may seem to be of minor importance if the statute is to serve some
purpose other than to educate the professions affected by the prob-
lem, a mandatory statute is the desirable choice.
It has been asserted that a penalty should not be imposed for
the failure to make a report which depends on a subjective deter-
17 Office of the General Counsel, AMA, Editorial, 188 J.A.M.A. 386 (1964): "Child
abuse is insidious. Only the more flagrant cases come to public attention. Many in-
stances do not come to the attention of the physicians, and in those that do, it is often
discovered that the child had suffered previously from maltreatment or injury by his
parents or guardian." Ibid.
Is It is possible that the statute will be used in bad faith (reporting unoffending
parents) by such people as relatives and neighbors. However, this danger is dearly
outweighed by the need for a solution to the problem.
19 OHIo REv. CODE § 2151.421 (Supp. 1966).
Any physician ... or any registered nurse, visiting nurse, school teacher, or
social worker... having reason to believe that a child... has suffered any
wound, injury, disability, or condition of such a nature as to reasonably indi-
cate abuse or neglect ... shall immediately report ... such information to a
municipal or county peace officer. Ibid.
OH1o REV. CODE 5 2151.99(C) (Supp. 1966) imposes either a fine of five to one hun-
dred dollars, imprisonment for one to ten days, or both, for failure to make a report.
20 ALASKA STAT. § 11.67.010 (1965).
21 MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp. 1966).
22 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-13 (Supp. 1965).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp. 1965).
24 TBx. REv. CoDE ANN. art. 695c-2 (Supp. 1966).
25 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1966).
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mination of a condition.2" The Ohio statute requires a report from
one "who has reason to believe" that the child's injury is of such
nature as to "reasonably indicate" abuse or neglect.2 The assertion
is reasonable because of the great difficulty involved in determining
that an injury was intentionally inflicted, and because such beatings
usually take place in the secrecy of the home with the child either
too young or too afraid to speak and the unoffending spouse reluc-
tant to accuse the other. In addition, at times the cover-up explana-
tions offered by the parents may sufficiently account for the injury
suffered by the child. 8 Thus, states with permissive reporting stat-
utes leave the matter in the discretion of the attending physician or
other medical personnel.
In these circumstances a compulsory reporting statute is pref-
erable because it impresses upon a vacillating physician the fact
that child abuse is a social-medical-legal problem and that interests
are involved other than his diagnosis and treatment of the child.
Thus, it is essential that social service and legal authorities be noti-
fied, since it is only through them that the ultimate solution to the
problem can be achieved. Furthermore, it has been pointed out
that the psychological reluctance of some individuals to believe that
any parent would ever abuse his child is one reason why there are
not more reports.2 9 In view of this problem, a mandatory rather
than a permissive statute would seem better suited to alerting such
individuals to reality. Finally, where the well-being of the commu-
nity has demanded it, physicians and others have traditionally been
required to make reports," and in the case of child abuse the wel-
fare of the community is no less endangered.
Perhaps the major deficiency of the original Ohio statute was
the absence of any provision for post-report procedure. The statu-
tory mandate ended with the making of the report to a local law
enforcement official. 1 The natural inference to be drawn from
the statute was that eventual prosecution of the guilty parties was
to follow. But what about the child? The real purpose of a re-
porting statute should not be to prosecute guilty parents but to pro-
2 6 See 44 TEXAS L. REV. 584, 585 n.9 (1966).
2 7 OHIo REV. CODE § 2151.421 (Supp. 1966).
2 8 Interview With Head Resident of Babies and Childrens' Hospital, in Cleveland,
Ohio, Mar. 3, 1967.
2 9 Kempe, Silverman, Steel, Droegenmueller & Silver, supra note 5, at 19.
30 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2917.44 (Supp. 1966) (duty of a physician to re-
port gunshot wounds); Omo REV. CODE § 3701.25 (duty of a physician to report cases
of occupational diseases).
3 1 Ohio Laws 1963, § 2151.421, at 625.
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tect the child against further abuse. In this regard, the statute has
been greatly improved by the amendment. Peace officers are now
directed to refer the report to the appropriate county department of
welfare or child welfare board in charge of children's services, the
welfare agency and the law enforcement agency are then to coop-
erate in the investigation of the case.82  The agency is to "provide
such social services as are necessary to protect the child and preserve
the family"88 and must submit to the county or city prosecutor a
report containing recommendations it deems necessary for the fu-
ture protection of the child. 4
The above provisions indicate that the present law's spirit is
protective rather than punitive. This conclusion is reinforced by
the fact that the reporting statute is in the chapter of the Revised
Code dealing with juvenile courts where the maximum age of the
children affected by the reporting law is set at eighteen.8" Thus it
seems that prosecution, especially in the less flagrant cases, is not
likely to follow a report of child abuse. It is more likely that any
proceedings instituted would be in the nature of an injunction or
custody proceeding, if that is necessary.8" Moreover, by providing
that the legal investigation of the case be conducted in conjunction
with the child welfare agency, the psychological and sociological
aspects of the case may also be taken into consideration to deter-
mine what is in the best interest of the child. This is especially de-
sirable because the fundamental cause of child abuse seems to be a
poor family environment caused by a myriad of psychiatric and emo-
tional problems. In this respect, a thorough investigation, always
conducted with due regard to parental rights and inadequacies,
32 OHo REV. CODE § 2151.421 (Supp. 1966).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
85 OMO REV. CODE S 2151.01. In the case of a crippled or physically handicapped
child, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the child reaches twenty-one
years of age.
Like Ohio, the policy followed in most states is that the maximum age of children
affected by the reporting statute corresponds to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. But
see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 5 74-111 (Supp. 1966) and Mo. REV. STAT. S 210.105
(Supp. 1966), where the maximum age is twelve.
36 Accord, OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.27-.28. The reporting statute does provide
that the child may be taken from the parents by the reporting physician and the peace
officer to whom the report is made, but only where immediate removal is considered
essential to protect the child from further injury or abuse. Otherwise, parental custody
is not to be terminated without consultation with the county department of welfare.
The delegation of such power to the reporting physician and peace officer has been
justifiably questioned. McCoid, supra note 16, at 50.
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should also take into consideration possible dangers to other chil-
dren in the family."
Perhaps the most legally significant provisions of the Ohio re-
porting statute are: (1) the grant of civil and criminal immunity to
anyone participating in the filing of child abuse reports; and (2)
the suspension of the physician-patient privilege.8 Of the states
that have enacted mandatory reporting legislation, only Wisconsin
fails expressly to grant immunity from suit by the parents.89 Un-
doubtedly, a false report of child abuse could do great damage to
the parents' reputation where the injury to the child is severe enough
to impute the commission of a crime. In Ohio it seems quite dear
that under the proper circumstances such a report would constitute
libel per se or slander.4" Where false statements are made under
the child abuse reporting statute, however, it is doubtful that a par-
ent or other guardian would have a cause of action against the per-
son who is responsible.41 Further, it was observed that many phy-
sicians had been reluctant to report because of the possible damage
to their professional reputation which could result from having to
fight a lawsuit.42 With the immunity granted to physicians by the
amended statute, that basis for their reluctance is no longer justi-
fied.48
Another provision of the recent Ohio statute is designed not
only to encourage the reporting of child abuse cases but also to effec-
tuate legal proceedings following such a report. This provision
suspends the physician-patient privilege in any judicial proceeding
which may result from a report.44 It may be said that the privilege
is that of the patient alone and that the parent, not being the pa-
37 Reinhart & Elmer, supra note 5, at 360.
88 Omo REv. CoDE § 2151.421 (Supp. 1966).
39WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Supp. 1967).
40 34 OHIo JmR. 2D Libel & Slander § 10, at 183 (1958).
41 First, the traditional requisite of intent to defame would, at best, be difficult to
prove. Further, where a physidan, teacher, or social worker reports a case of supposed
child abuse, the presumption is strongly in favor of the fact that it was made in the
best interest of the child rather than with an intent to defame the parents.
42 McCoid, supra note 16, at 39; Interview With Dr. Lester Adelson, sopra note 12.
43 A communication in reference to which the maker has a legal, moral, or social
obligation has long been held in Ohio to grant the maker a qualified privilege. Accord,
Popke v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N.E. 248 (1926). Similarly, in the case
of the reporting statute, the informant would be acting under a statutory duty to report.
44 Omo REV. CODE § 215 1.421. Ohio grants the statutory privilege that a physi-
dan may not testify concerning a communication made to him by the patient during a
physican-patient relationship. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A). Furthermore, a phy-
sidan may have his license suspended or revoked for the violation of that confidence.
OMo REV. CODE § 4731.22.
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tient, may make no such claim.4" But the Ohio statutory privilege
is quite absolute in its terms and, unlike many states' statutory pro-
visions, the privilege remains unless expressly waived.46 The child
who is often of tender years and most likely an infant is not able to
waive the privilege.47
Thus, where the testimony of the examining physician is the
only real evidence against the abusive parents, judicial proceedings
could well be ineffectual. The suspension of the privilege in the
reporting statute will prevent this result, and all evidence can come
before the tribunal for an adjudication most beneficial to the child.
If the physician wishes to testify, there is no statutory bar to his do-
ing so. But as one commentator has pointed out, the ethical prin-
ciple behind the rule against disclosing privileged communications
may be more important than the evidentiary technicality as far as
the doctor is concerned.4" Such an individual may still be reluc-
tant to report the abusive parents who have sought his medical as-
sistance. Such conflicting values cannot be resolved by legislation.
However, the issue should be resolved in favor of the child, who
may be released only to return to more maltreatment which may
ultimately cause him permanent injury or death. Parental emo-
tional and psychological inadequacies invariably surmount their ex-
pressed good intentions towards the child at the time of treatment.
A discussion of the physician-patient privilege raises the ques-
tion of privileged communicatiois between husband and wife. In
the case of an accusation of child abuse arising in Ohio, the offend-
ing spouse would seem to be precluded from invoking the privilege
where the innocent spouse wishes to testify. Although the report-
ing statute does not mention that privilege, section 2945.42 of the
Ohio Revised Code suspends the husband-wife privilege in all cases
brought for the neglect of or cruelty to their children.
In conclusion, it may be said that section 2151.421 represents
a legal response to a call originally made by the medical profes-
sion. The new law will not prevent isolated instances of child
abuse, but it should check the physical and mental damage which
may result from repeated maltreatment. The ultimate success of
45 8 WiGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2386, at 851 n.2 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
4 6 O-IO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A).
47 It would certainly not be in the best interest of the guilty parents to waive the
privilege for the child. Even if they wished to do so, the Ohio rule, unlike the rules of
a majority of other states, would not allow it. Cf. Parisky v. Pierstorff, 63 Ohio App.
503, 27 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
48 McCoid, suapra note 16, at 33.
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the statute depends entirely upon the efforts of those it requires to
act. The subjective determination of child abuse within the mean-
ing of the statute leaves great latitude for passivity and avoidance
in order to escape its mandate. But such things cannot be legis-
lated against. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the law will rest
on interprofessional effort and education in respect to the problem.
Unlike most laws, the reporting statute's effectiveness will de-
crease as the public awareness of its existence increases. If parents
become aware of the fact that, by taking their "battered child" to a
physician, they are likely to be reported to local government officials
or agencies, they might refrain from seeking treatment of the child.
Thus, the child whom the law seeks to protect would be in a worse
position than he would have been without the statute. The answer
to the apparent dilemma lies in the desire of doctors, nurses, teach-
ers, and social workers to inform themselves about the problem and
to assume the corresponding responsibility.
MARIO C. CmANo
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